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Transforming Transplantation:
The Effect of the Health and
Human Services Final Rule on
the Organ Allocation System
By DULCINEA A. GRANTHAM*
ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, once a risky and uncommon proce-
dure, is now a routine medical procedure with a relatively high success
rate.1 Organ transplantation was considered an experimental proce-
dure until 1954, when medical science made a tremendous break-
through with the first successful kidney transplant. 2 Shortly thereafter,
in 1967, the first human liver was successfully transplanted. 3 As trans-
plantation procedures have become more successful, demand for
them has increased dramatically.4 The supply of available organs has
proven insufficient to satisfy this demand.5 As of September 2000, the
number of patients awaiting an organ transplant in the United States
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1. See Putting Patients First: Resolving Allocation of Transplant Organs: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Health and Env't of the House Comm. on Commerce and the Sen. Labor and Human
Res. Comm., 105th Cong. 69 (1998) [hereinafter Putting Patients First Hearing] (statement of
the Honorable Donna E. Shalala, Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services).
2. See United Network for Organ Sharing, Critical Data Milestones, at http://www.
unos.org/newsroom/critdata%5Fmilestones.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2000) (noting that
the first successful kidney transplant was performed by Dr. Joseph E. Murray at Brigham &
Women's Hospital, Boston, Massachusetts).
3. See id. (noting that the first successful liver transplant was performed by Dr.
Thomas Starzl, at the University of Colorado Health Sciences Center, Denver, Colorado).
4. See Press Release, Health Res. Serv. Admin., Improving the Nation's Organ Trans-
plantation System, Oct. 18, 1999.
[T]he number of organ transplants performed each year in the United States has
grown from 12,618 in 1988 to 20,961 in 1998. The number of patients awaiting
transplantation has grown even more rapidly: from about 14,000 in 1988 .. . to
some 66,000 persons on waiting lists for organ transplantation today, ranging in
condition from non-urgent to extremely urgent.
Id.
5. See id. ("Organ donation has grown . . . slowly-from 5,906 donors in 1988 to
9,913 in 1998.").
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exceeded 76,000.6 A new patient is added to the list every fourteen
minutes. 7 The number of donors who provided organs in 1999 totaled
just 10,538.8 This shortage of transplantable organs has reached epi-
demic proportions in the last decade due to technological advances
that allow transplant patients to live longer while waiting for organs. 9
Until very recently, organs in the United States were distributed
on a regional basis to patients based upon their need. This system was
greatly criticized by health professionals, members of Congress, state
officials, and even the organization charged with overseeing the distri-
bution of organs because it often resulted in discrepant distribution
based solely upon a patient's location.' 0 In an effort to improve the
current transplantation system, the Department of Health and
Human Services Secretary Shalala issued the Final Rule granting her-
self, as Secretary, the power to determine the way in which organs
would be distributed." The Final Rule was met with great opposition
by members of Congress and a number of state legislatures.1 2 Many
feared the Final Rule called for a nationwide, need-based system of
organ distribution. Several states proposed legislation prohibiting dis-
tribution of donated organs outside their state13 and filed lawsuits
6. See United Network for Organ Sharing, Critical Data, at http://www.unos.org/
Newsroom/critdatamain.htm (last visited June 20, 2001).
7. See United Network for Organ Sharing, at http://www.unos.org (last visited June
20, 2001).
8. See United Network for Organ Sharing, Critical Data, at http://www.unos.org/
Newsroom/critdatamain.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2000) (observing that a total of 5,848
cadaveric donors and 4,690 living donors were received).
9. See Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network Amendments of 1999: Hearing before
the Subcomm. on Health and Env't of the House Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. 23 (Sept. 22,
1999) [hereinafter OPTN Hearing] (statement of William F. Raub, Ph.D., Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Science Policy).
10. See Health Res. Serv. Admin., supra note 4, at I ("Since there are too few organs
available to provide for all patients, the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network
(OPTN) needs to allocate organs in as medically effective and fair a manner as possible, to
save lives and make best use of this scarce resource.").
11. See Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 63 Fed. Reg. 16,296 (Apr.
2, 1998) (codified as amended at 42 C.F.R. § 121).
12. See Richard Willing, State, Federal Officials Battle Over Donor Organs, USA TODAY,
Mar. 15, 1999, at A3 ("[It is] unconstitutional for a federal agency to simply override our
states' laws .... And medically it's a bad idea. It would cause delay and lessen success if
you're shipping organs all over the country." (quoting Richard Ieyoub, Louisiana's Attor-
ney General)).
13. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-846 (West 2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:2353
(West 2000); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 2204 (West 2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-43-420
(Law. Co-op. 2000); Wis. STAT. ANN. tit. § 157.06(9) (West 2000).
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against Secretary Shalala and the Department of Health and Human
Services ("HHS") to oppose the Final Rule.14
This Comment provides an overview of the organ allocation sys-
tem, focusing primarily on the intense debate among the states, which
favor local distribution of organs, and the Final Rule, which favors a
national, need-based system. Part I of this Comment discusses the
evolution of organ procurement laws, including the National Organ
Transplantation Act's ("NOTA") establishment of the Organ Procure-
ment and Transplantation Network ("OPTN"), the local Organ Pro-
curement Organizations, and the organ transplantation process. Part
II discusses the original HHS Final Rule and analyzes the various con-
gressional attempts to delay the implementation of the Final Rule. Ad-
ditionally, Part II critiques the various state laws that have been
enacted in response to the Final Rule, and their constitutionality in
light of the Final Rule's preemption provision. Part II examines law-
suits brought by several states against the Department of Health and
Human Services and Secretary Shalala, and the validity of the claims
on which they are brought. Part III discusses the amended Final Rule
and the current status of the organ allocation system in light of its
implementation. Moreover, Part III discusses several bills that were in-
troduced in Congress to modify or nullify the effects of the Final Rule.
Part IV provides a critical analysis of both the local organ distribution
and national organ distribution systems. Finally, Part V concludes that
a quasi-national, need-based system of organ distribution, managed by
the United Network for Organ Sharing ("UNOS"), with limited over-
sight by the HHS, is necessary to overcome the deficiencies inherent
in a local distribution system and provide for more equitable organ
allocation.
I. Background
A. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
Congress first took action on organ transplantation in 1968 when
it passed the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act ("UAGA"). 15 The UAGA
was drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws ("NCCUSL") and was presented to Congress in an
effort to achieve uniformity among state laws pertaining to organ do-
14. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Shalala, No. OO-C-155 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 22, 2000).
15. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL Givr ArT OF 1968, 8A U.L.A. 63 (1993).
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nation.16 The UAGA gave individuals over age eighteen the legal right
to decide whether to donate all or part of their bodies after their
death.17 Additionally, the UAGA provided that the family of a de-
ceased may donate her organs posthumously unless there is evidence
that the deceased did not want her organs donated.'8 By the mid-
1970s, every state and the District of Columbia had adopted some
form of the 1968 UAGA.' 9
B. The National Organ Transplant Act of 1984
In the years following the enactment of the UAGA, the organ
transplantation system became greatly flawed and extremely ineffec-
tive. 20 In particular, there was no single source of authority in the dis-
tribution of organs. 21 In 1984, Congress enacted the National Organ
Transplant Act 22 to streamline the organ transplantation process. 23
NOTA is "designed to strengthen the Nation's health care system to
provide organ transplants to thousands of patients across the coun-
try." 2 4 NOTA provides for the establishment of a network that over-
sees the distribution of organs and provides some governance to this
flawed system.
NOTA directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services to es-
tablish a task force on organ transplantation. 25 The task force is to
"conduct comprehensive examinations of the medical, legal, ethical,
economic, and social issues presented by human organ procurement
16. SeeJohn A. Sten, Comment, Rethinking the National Organ Transplant Program: Wen
Push Comes to Shove, 11 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 197, 204 (1994).
17. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL Giwr Acr OF 1968 § 2(a), 8A U.L.A. 63, 99 (1993).
18. See id. at § 2(b).
19. See Sten, supra note 16, at 205.
20. See 130 CONG. REC. 8740, 8742 (1984).
The Congress finds and declares that-(3) the absence of coordinated and effec-
tive systems to solicit, identify, and match organ donors with transplant patients
has forced such patients to resort to public appeals through the mass media in
order to procure the organs needed for transplantation; and (4) a cooperative
relationship between an informed public and a receptive medical community is
necessary for the identification and procurement of organs for transplantation.
Id.
21. See id. at 8740.
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 273 (1994).
23. See 130 CONG. REc. H17332, 17333 (1984) (statement of Rep. Moakley) ("One of
the issues of concern in the 98th Congress is the need for a more efficient and comprehen-
sive nationwide network to match organ donors with the many individuals in the country
who are in desperate need of a transplant.").
24. 130 CONG. Rtc. H17333 (1984).
25. See 42 U.S.C. § 273.
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and transplantation."26 Arguably, NOTA's most important contribu-
tion to the transplantation process was the establishment of the Organ
Procurement and Transplantation Network.
27
C. The Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network
The Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network maintains
a list of those who need organs and matches those individuals when
an organ becomes available. 28 The OPTN also assists organ procure-
ment organizations in the distribution of organs which cannot be
placed within their region, adopts standards of quality for the acquisi-
tion and transportation of donated organs, coordinates the transpor-
tation of organs from organ procurement organizations ("OPOs") to
transplant centers, and collects, analyzes, and publishes data concern-
ing organ donation and transplants. 29
NOTA requires that the OPTN "be a private nonprofit entity
which is not engaged in any activity unrelated to organ procure-
ment."30 The United Network for Organ Sharing ("UNOS") is the
non-profit organization legally responsible for oversight of the
OPTN. 31 UNOS is "the 'umbrella organization' for organ procure-
ment, transplantation, and statistical information since Congress es-
tablished the OPTN."32 It is under a contract with the Health
Resources and Services Administration ("HRSA"), a division of the
HHS, to run the nation's organ transplant system.33 UNOS first con-
tracted with HRSA in 198634 and renewed its contract in September
2000.35 UNOS had previously contracted with the HRSA to run the
scientific registry that "tracks transplant patients and studies how they
are affected by changes in organ donation policy," but lost the registry
26. d.
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 274(a) (1994) ("The Secretary shall by contract provide for the
establishment and operation of an Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network.").
28. See id. at § 274(b) (2) (A) (i)-(ii).
29. See id. at § 274(b) (2) (A) (iii).
30. Id. at § 274(b)(1)(A).
31. See United Network for Organ Sharing, Who We Are, at http://www.unos.org/
framDefault.asp?Category=about (last visited Nov. 17, 2000).
32. Gail L. Daubert, Note and Comment, Politics, Policies, and Problems with Organ
Transplantation: Government Regulation Needed to Ration Organs Equitably, 50 ADMIN. L. REV.
459, 466 (1998).
33. See National Journal's Daily Briefing, American Health Line, at http://nationaljour-
nal.com/pubs/healthline/m000929.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2000).
34. See United Network for Organ Sharing, Newsroom, at http://www.unos.org/News
room/allabout_main.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2000).
35. See National Journal's Daily Briefing, American Health Line, at http://nationaljour-
nal.com/pubs/healthline/m000929.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2000).
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contract in September 2000 to the University Renal Research and Ed-
ucation Association. 36 Though it lost this contract, UNOS has main-
tained its primary responsibility-the governance of the organ
distribution system.
UNOS has divided the country into eleven geographic regions,
which are further subdivided into smaller organ procurement organi-
zation service areas.37 There are currently sixty-nine OPOs in the
United States.38 The transplant centers that receive organs from the
OPOs are required to belong to the OPTN and abide by its rules in
order to be eligible for Medicare and Medicaid funds.3 9
UNOS "has established various allocation systems for cadaveric
kidneys, livers, thoracic organs, pancreas and intestinal organs, as well
as a separate system for organs not specifically addressed. ''40 The Pa-
tient Access to Transplantation Coalition ("PATTC") described
UNOS's then-existing liver allocation policy to the House Commerce
Committee and Subcommittee on Health and the Environment and
the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources as follows:
Under the current liver allocation policy UNOS keeps a list of
every patient in the United States waiting for a transplant. When an
organ becomes available, it is offered first to the sickest patients
(ranked "Status 1") within the local [OPO] service area. If the or-
gan cannot be used by a Status 1 patient on the local list, it is then
offered to the remaining patients on the list (which ranks patients
according to severity of illness as Status 1, 2A, 2B or 3). If the OPO,
working with local hospitals, is unable to find a match for the
donated organ on the local list, it then offers the organ to patients
in the multi-state OPTN region, again giving priority to those in
the gravest physical condition. If the OPO fails to find a match
within the region, it will offer the donated organ to patients nation-
wide, with priority again given to the sickest patients. 41
This description demonstrates that the existing system is truly a "local
first" system, as it focuses on the placement of organs within the local
area before offering them to out-of-state patients.
The OPTN system as administered by UNOS has been severely
criticized in recent years for the discrepancy in the supply of organs
36. Id.
37. See United Network for Organ Sharing, All About UNOS, at www.unos.org/about/
whattxsystem.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 1999).
38. See id.
39. See Organ Transplant Amendments of 1988, Title IV, Pub. L. No. 100-607, § 401
(1988) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 201).
40. Putting Patients First Hearing, supra note 1, available at http://www.unos.org/news
room/archiveregsjtestimony-pattc.htm (last visited.June 20, 2001) (testimony of Patient
Access to Transplantation Coalition).
41. Id.
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among the various OPOs. 42 Critics argue that the OPOs in some re-,
gions have a larger supply of transplantable organs and this disparity
unfairly prejudices those that do not reside in the well-supplied re-
gions.43 Wisconsin, for example, has worked very hard to increase or-
gan donations, and as a result, the state "has one of the nation's
highest rates of organ donation. '44 Therefore, a patient residing in
Wisconsin will have a decreased waiting time for an organ transplant.
The UNOS allocation criterion for the organs often results in dispro-
portionate waiting times and less medically urgent patients receiving
organs. 45
II. The Final Rule
A. The Original 1998 Final Rule
In response to criticism regarding organ allocation nationwide,
HHS Secretary Shalala announced a new regulation, the Final Rule,
on April 2, 1998. The Secretary indicated the transplant community
must be "prepared to adjust Federal policies to meet the intent of the
[NOTA] ."46 According to the Secretary, the purpose of NOTA was to
ensure "an equitable nationwide system for the distribution of trans-
plantable organs,"47 as opposed to the current system in which "where
you live and where you list can determine whether you live or die."48
According to Secretary Shalala, the 1998 Rule was designed to:
[I] mprove the effectiveness and equity of the Nation's transplanta-
tion system and to further the purposes of the National Organ
Transplant Act of 1984, as amended. These purposes include: en-
couraging organ donation; developing an organ allocation system
that functions as much as technologically feasible on a nationwide
basis; providing the bases for effective Federal oversight of the
OPTN ... and, providing better information about transplantation
to patients, families and health care providers.49
42. See Putting Patients First Hearing, supra note 1, at 71 (statement of the Honorable
Donna E. Shalala, Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services).
43. See Sarah Yang, U.S. Seeks to Overhaul Organ Transplant Policy, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1,
1999, at Al.
44. John Fauber, Court Dismisses Lawsuit Over Organ Transplants, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL
SENTINEL, Nov. 28, 2000, at 2B.
45. See Putting Patients First Hearing, supra note 1, at 71 (statement of the Honorable
Donna E. Shalala, Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services).
46. Id. at 75.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 63 Fed. Reg. 16,296 (Apr. 2,
1998) (codified as amended at 42 C.F.R. § 121).
Summer 20011
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
The original Rule intended to do away with the "local first" system and
broaden the area in which organs are allocated.50 The transplant com-
munity welcomed the provisions of the Rule that called for increased
organ donation and better information for patients. It disliked, how-
ever, the aspects of the Rule that allowed for the complete transforma-
tion of the organ allocation system from a local system to a much
broader, nearly national, system of allocation.
In addition to allowing for the possibility of a national distribu-
tion system, the original Final Rule set forth three performance goals
to be achieved by the OPTN. 5' The first required the OPTN to "define
objective and measurable medical criteria to be used by all transplant
centers in determining whether a patient is appropriate to be listed
for a transplant."5 2 This essentially required the establishment of a list
of criteria which a doctor could use to determine whether she should
add a given patient to the list of those awaiting transplants.
Second, the OPTN was to "determine objective medical criteria
to be used nationwide in determining the medical status of those
awaiting transplantation. '53 Among the requirements were a specified
status of urgency, probability of success of a transplant, and age. Re-
quiring all doctors and medical facilities to abide by the same criteria
assures that all patients awaiting a transplant are in as equal need as
possible.
Finally, the OPTN was "required to develop equitable allocation
policies that provide organs to those with the greatest medical ur-
gency, in accordance with sound medical judgment.",5 4 It is this provi-
sion which opened the door for the establishment of a nationwide
organ distribution system, because many believe the only way to effec-
tively provide organs to the most medically needy patients is to estab-
lish broader or national distribution areas. Proponents of a broader
sharing system feel that it is the only way to assure that the most medi-
cally needy patients receive priority in distribution. 55 The original
Rule also included a provision preempting any state law that "limits
organ sharing policies." 56
50. See id.
51. See id. at 16,296-97.
52. Id. at 16,296.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 16,296-97.
55. See OlP'N Hearing, supra note 9, at 32-33 (statement of Robert D. Gibbons, Mem-
ber, Institute of Medicine).
56. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 63 Fed. Reg. 16,296, 16,338
(Apr. 2, 1998) (codified as amended at 42 C.F.R. § 121.12).
[Vol. 35
ORGAN ALLOCATION
Though not explicit in the original Rule, ,many argued that it ad-
vocated for the abandonment of the existing "local first" organ alloca-
tion practice in favor of a national, need-based practice.5 7 The
Secretary insisted that the Rule did not contain any allocation policy,
but left its creation to UNOS.58
However, these assurances that the HHS was leaving the develop-
ment of allocation policies to the transplant community were less than
reassuring for many. The President of UNOS, testifying at a Congres-
sional hearing on the original Rule, stated that "the proposed HHS
[Rule] causes the transplant community great concern. 15 9 UNOS ob-
jected to the HHS usurpation of the.policy-making role, the expan-
sion of the geographic areas in which organs would be distributed,
and the allocation of organs to the most medically deserving patients
first.60 UNOS and the transplant community believed the following
conclusions Would result from the type of allocation system proposed
by the rule: longer waiting times and more deaths; and the forced
closure of small and medium-sized transplant programs, resulting in
negative consequences for minorities and the poor.61
B. Actions Taken to Block the Implementation and Effects of the
Original Final Rule
1. Congressional Action
Immediately following the announcement of the HHS's original
Final Rule, Congress took action to block its implementation. 62 The
Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
Act of 1999 ("Omnibus Act") delayed the implementation of the origi-
nal Rule until October 21, 1999.63 The Omnibus Act called for inde-
pendent review through the National Academy of Science's Institute
57. See Putting Patients First Hearing, supra note 1, at 78 (statement of the Honorable
Donna E. Shalala, Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services) ("UNOS
has claimed that the rule creates a single national waiting list for patients that would result
in more patients' deaths and longer waits for all patients across the country.").
58. See id. at 77 ("I reiterate that the Department does not have a preconceived notion
of any allocation policies. We are relying on the transplant community to develop the
policy.").
59. Putting Patients First Hearing, supra note 1, at 138 (statement of Dr. L. Hunsicker,
President, UNOS).
60. See id. at 138-39.
61. See id. at 136.
62. See Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of
1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 213(a), 112 Stat. 2681-359 (1998).
63. See id.
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of Medicine ("IOM").64 The IOM was called upon to conduct a review
of the current policies of the OPTN and the original Rule in order to
determine the reasons for the discrepancy in organ availability, the
impact of sharing organs based on medical criteria rather than geog-
raphy, and the impact on patient survival rates. 65 The IOM was also to
make any recommendations to change the existing policies or the
original Rule. 6 6 The Omnibus Act directed the HHS Secretary to con-
duct a series of discussions with OPTN to discuss and resolve issues
raised by the original Rule. 6 7
The IOM issued its report onJuly 22, 1999.68 The report contains
five major recommendations for improving the organ allocation sys-
tem.69 First, the report concludes that the transplantation system
would be more effective if livers were allocated over larger popula-
tions than those existing in the current OPO structure. 70 The report
suggests that the Organ Allocation Areas ("OAAs") for livers serve a
population base of at least nine million people.7' Second, the report
encourages the discontinuance of waiting time as an allocation crite-
rion for patients in Statuses 2 and 3.72 Third, the report suggests the
exercise of federal oversight to manage the transplantation system. 73
Fourth, the report states that the HHS should establish independent
scientific review to ensure that the system is as effective and equitable
as possible.74 Finally, the report recommends the improvement of
data collection and dissemination in order to increase public confi-
dence in the system. 75
64. See id. at § 213(b)(1)(H).
65. See id. at § 213(c)(1).
66. See Institute of Medicine, Organ Procurement and Transplantation: Assessing Current
Policies and the Potential Impact of the HHS Final Rule (Report of the Committee on Organ
Procurement and Transplantation Policy, Division of Health Sciences Policy, Institute of
Medicine) (National Academy Press 1999) [hereinafter IOM Report].
67. See Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of
1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 213(a), 112 Stat. 2681-359 (1998).
68. See IOM Report, supra note 66.
69. See id. at 6.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 10-13. See also United Network for Organ Sharing, Newsroom, available at
http://www.unos.org/Newsroom/archiveother rationale_objectives.htm (last visited Apr.
5, 2001) (stating that a patient deemed a Status 2 "requires continuous medical care but
not continuous hospitalization." A Status 3 patient is "continuously hospitalized but not in
the intensive care unit.").
73. See IOM Report, supra note 66, at 14.
74. See id.
75. See id at 14-15.
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2. State Action
a. State Legislation
Upon the promulgation of the original Rule, a number of states
enacted statutes to limit its effect.76 The states were very concerned
that organs donated by their residents would be used to help those
outside the state, which would result in a decrease in the general will-
ingness to donate. 77 Anticipating such action by the states, the HHS
included a preemption provision in the original Rule which provides:
No state or local governing entity shall establish or continue in ef-
fect any law, rule, regulation, or other requirement that would re-
strict in any way the ability of any transplant hospital, OPO, or
other party to comply with the organ allocation policies of the
OPTN or other policies of the OPTN that have been approved by
the Secretary under this part.
78
The preemption clause leaves very little, if any, room for the states to
promulgate regulations protecting use of their organs by out-of-state
patients.
Despite the Rule's preemption provision, a number of state legis-
lators introduced and succeeded in passing laws that expressly prohib-
ited the transfer of organs out of state unless a suitable match was not
found within the state.7 9 Some of these statutes allow an out-of-state
transfer only if there is a reciprocal agreement with an out-of-state
OPO.80
76. See Kentucky Legislature Moving to Join List of States Mandating Organs be Offered to
Residents First, TRANSPLANT NEWS, Jan. 28, 2000, available at 2000 WL 14581873.
77. See Jenny Price, State to Sue on Organ Policy Wisconsin Could Lose Under New Rules for
Donation Distribution, Wis. ST. J., Mar. 15, 2000, at Al.
78. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 63 Fed. Reg. 16,338 (Apr. 2,
1998) (codified as amended at 42 C.F.R. § 121).
79. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2204 (2000).
Organ procurement organization may only transfer a vascular organ to an out-of-
state organ procurement organization or suitable out-of-state recipient for trans-
plantation if one of the following requirements is met: (a) a suitable recipient in
the State . .. is not known to the designated [OPO] within the amount of time
necessary to preserve the organ; or (b) the designated [OPO] has a reciprocal
agreement.
Id. See also N.M. SrAT ANN. § 24-6A-6.1 (Michie 2000) (same as Oklahoma's); TEx. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE ANN. § 692.0145 (West 2000) (same); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17:2353 (West
2000) (same); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.236(3) (Michie 2000) (OPO "shall not be man-
dated to transfer an organ for transplantation to an out-of-state [OPO] ... if a suitable
recipient can be identified at a transplant center within its service area .... ); Aiuz. REV.
STAT. § 36-846 (2000) ("A vascular organ obtained by an [OPO] designated to service [in]
this state must be used in this state."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-43-420(B) (Law. Co-op. 2000)
("The [OPO] may only transfer an organ to an out-of-state [OPO] ... if a suitable recipi-
ent in this state cannot be found in a reasonable amount of time.").
80. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2204 (2000).
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b. Preemption of State Laws
The enactment of state legislation which directly conflicts with
the preemption clause of the original Rule prompts serious federalism
concerns.8' This Comment will limit its discussion of preemption to
whether the laws enacted by the States in response to the HHS Final
Rule will withstand constitutional scrutiny.
The preemption power is derived from the Supremacy Clause of
the United States Constitution, which states that "the Laws of the
United States ...shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Consti-
tution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. '" 82 It has
been argued by critics of the original Rule that a court considering
the issue should find the preemption clause of the Rule invalid be-
cause Congress has never explicitly granted the HHS the power to
preempt state law, and the statutory language of NOTA does not
make a grant of such power to the HHS. 83 NOTA gives the HHS a
limited supervisorial role in the organ procurement process, not a
managerial role.8 4 Under NOTA, the HHS Secretary is to inform the
public of the need for organ donations, provide technical assistance to
OPOs and submit annual reports to Congress on the efficiency and
effectiveness of the procurement and allocation of organs, and make
known any problems that exist with the system. 85
If the Rule's preemption clause was found not to preempt the
state laws prohibiting out-of-state organ transfers under the above
analysis, it is arguable that the state laws would be struck down on
dormant Commerce Clause grounds.8 6 The power of Congress to reg-
ulate interstate commerce is derived from Article I, § 8 of the United
Organ procurement organization may only transfer a vascular organ to an out-of-
state organ procurement organization or suitable out-of-state recipient for trans-
plantation if one of the following requirements is met: (a) a suitable recipient in
the State ... is not known to the designated [OPO] within the amount of time
necessary to preserve the organ; or (b) the designated [OPO] has a reciprocal
agreement.
Id. See also N.M. STAT ANN. § 24-6A-6.1 (Michie 2000) (same as Oklahoma's); TEX. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE ANN. § 692.0145 (West 2000) (same); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17:2353 (West
2000) (same).
81. See Roderick T. Chen, Note, Organ Allocation and the States: Can the States Restrict
Broader Organ Sharing?, 49 DuKE LJ. 261, 274 (1999).
82. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
83. See Chen, supra note 81, at 279-80. See also Wisconsin v. Shalala, No. OO-C-55, at I
(W.D. Wis. Nov. 22, 2000) (order dismissing case).
84. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Shalala, No. OO-C-155, at 5.
85. See 42 U.S.C. § 274(c)(1)-(4) (1994).
86. See Chen, supra note 81, at 283.
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States Constitution.87 One of the fundamental tenets underlying the
Commerce Clause is the notion that one state cannot deliberately dis-
criminate against a citizen of another state. 88
The state laws at issue essentially provide that organs donated in
State A are not to leave State A for transplantation into a State B pa-
tient unless a suitable recipient cannot be found in State A, or a reci-
procity agreement exists between State A and State B. Under this
analysis, State A is clearly giving its citizens preferential treatment in
the organ procurement process at the expense of citizens in State B.
State A may argue that it is not discriminating against citizens in State
B, which would be an express violation of the dormant Commerce
Clause, but rather it is serving a legitimate state interest-the protec-
tion of a scarce resource. 89 Organs have been declared to be a "public
trust, "9° supporting the proposition that they are a resource worthy of
protection. Whether the state statutes will survive a Supremacy Clause
challenge remains to be seen. As of the date of publication, the Secre-
tary of HHS had not brought any suits challenging the state statutes
under the preemption provision of the Final Rule. Such a suit is un-
necessary until the Secretary determines that a national system of or-
gan allocation is to be used and requires the OPOs to distribute
organs on a national basis. This would require organs to leave the
states in direct violation of the state laws.
c. Wisconsin Lawsuit
In March 2000, former Wisconsin Governor Tommy Thompson
brought suit in federal court seeking injunctive relief against the Final
Rule. 91 Joining the State of Wisconsin in the lawsuit were the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin Hospitals and Clinics Authority, Froedtert Memorial
Lutheran Hospital, Oregon Health Sciences University, and the State
of New Jersey.92 The State of Louisiana attempted to intervene in the
case, but its motion to intervene was denied by the district court.93
87. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power to ... regulate
Commerce ... among the several states.").
88. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). See also Chen, supra note
81, at 284-85.
89. See Chen, supra note 81, at 288.
90. See 63 Fed. Reg. 16,296 (Apr. 2, 1998) (codified as amended at 42 C.F.R. § 121)
("Human organs that are donated for transplantation are a public trust.").
91. See Price, supra note 77, at Al. See also Wisconsin v. Shalala, No. OO-C-155 (W.D.
Wis. Nov. 22, 2000) (order dismissing case).
92. See Wisconsin v. Shalala, No. OO-C-155.
93. See id. at 2.
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(1) Legal Theory
The plaintiffs challenged the amended Final Rule 94 on the
grounds that it violated NOTA by "promulgating rules on subjects,
including organ allocation policies, that exceed the authority given
[to the Secretary] under the act."95 Both Wisconsin and New Jersey
brought suits in their capacity as parens patie°6 for their citizens.9 7 The
state plaintiffs claimed they were injured because "the Secretary's
usurpation of [the network's] policy making authority deprives Wis-
consin's citizens of the benefits of the federal system of organ alloca-
tion policy which the [NOTA] gives solely to [OPTN] ."98 The plaintiff
hospitals are members of OPOs and the OPTN who claim that they
have been injured as members of the OPTN because the defendant
"has stripped the network of its final policy making authority."99
(2) District Court Opinion
The suit was dismissed by DistrictJudge Barbara B. Crabb on No-
vember 22, 2000. The court dismissed the case on the ground that the
plaintiffs lacked standing. " 10 Standing is a constitutional requirement
of subject matter jurisdiction,'10 and without a "cognizable Article III
injury, [the] court has no power to hear [a] case."' 0 2 The court found
that the plaintiffs did not satisfy their burden of establishing standing
because they were unable to show that they suffered "an injury in
fact." 1 0 3 Regarding the hospital plaintiffs, the court found they had
not suffered an injury in fact because they were "not suing as repre-
sentatives of the [OPTN]. The only entity allegedly injured by the
change in ultimate decision making authority implemented by the
amended final rule is the [OPTN]."111 4 The state plaintiffs lacked
94. The original Final Rule, published on April 2, 1998, was delayed twice and
amended and did not become effective until March 16, 2000. For further discussion on this
Amended Final Rule, see discussion infra § Ill(A).
95. Wisconsin. v. Shalala, No. 00-C-155 at 2.
96. "Parent of his country; refers traditionally to the role of the state as sovereign and
guardian of persons under legal disability." BLACK's LAw DICTrONARY 114 (6th ed. 1990)
97, See Wisconsin v. Shalala, No. OO-C-155 at 3.
98. Id. at 16.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 2.
101. "Term refers to court's power to hear and determine cases of general class or
category to which proceedings in question belong; the power to deal with the general
subject matter involved in the action." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1425 (6th ed. 1990)
102. Wisconsin v. Shalala, No. OO-C-155 at 16. See also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
103. See Wisconsin v. Shalala, No. OO-C-155 at 24.
104. Id.
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standing because case law has demonstrated that "[a] state may not
bring a parens patriae suit against the federal government."'10 5 The is-
sue of ripeness was raised by the defendant, arguing that the case was
not ripe because the Secretary had not yet exercised the authority
granted to her by the amended Final Rule.' 0 6 The court declined to
address this issue because it was unnecessary in light of its determina-
tion of the standing issue. 10 7
(3) Appeals
Former Wisconsin Governor Thompson elected to appeal the dis-
trict court's decision. However, his successor, Governor Scott McCal-
lum, sought an end to the lawsuit."' )8 Governor McCallum chose to
end the lawsuit to avoid being in the awkward position of having to
sue Thompson, his former employer. 10 9 Additionally, McCallum
stated that a number of the other states named as plaintiffs in the suit
had decided to discontinue it, and it would be "ineffective and ineffi-
cient" for Wisconsin to continue a suit many have deemed a sure
loser.' 10
HI. Current Status of the Final Rule
A. The Amended Final Rule
The Final Rule, published on April 2, 1998, and delayed by the
Omnibus Act, was scheduled to become effective on October 21, 1999.
It was further delayed, however, by the Ticket to Work and Work In-
centives Improvement Act of 1999 ("Ticket to Work Act"), signed into
law by President Bill Clinton on December 17, 1999."11 The Ticket to
Work Act provided that the April 2, 1998 original Final Rule, together
with amendments published on October 20, 1999, would not become
effective before March 16, 2000.112 The HHS announced the stay of
105. Id. at 22. See also Ill. Dept. of Transp. v. Hinson, 122 F.3d 370, 373 (7th Cir. 1997);
Mass. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485-86 (1923) ("The United States, and not individual
states, represents citizens as parens patriae in the citizens' relations with the federal
government.").
106. See Wisconsin v. Shalala, No. OO-G-155 at 25.
107. See id.
108. SeeJohn Fauber, McCallum to End Organ Lawsuit, MILWAUKEEJ. & SENTINEL, Feb.
17, 2001, at H1.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No.
106-170 § 413 (Dec. 17, 1999). See also 65 Fed. Reg. 15,252 (Mar. 22, 2000).
112. See 65 Fed. Reg. 15,252 (Mar. 22, 2000).
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the Final Rule and informed the public of the opportunity to submit
comments on the amended Rule for sixty days.' 13
The amended Final Rule ("amended Rule") reflects the com-
ments received by the HHS on the 1998 Rule, the recommendations
made by the IOM report, and summarizes new transplant data devel-
oped during this time. 1 4 The amended Rule contains most of the
provisions of the original Rule, including the three performance goals
established in the original Rule. 115 The amended Rule also provides
clarification of several provisions in the original Rule that were the
source of much debate and criticism. 1 16
One notable clarification in the Rule specifies that it does not
require national lists for organ donation, but rather its goal is to
achieve sharing of organs in regions broad enough to assure that
those patients with greatest medical urgency are provided for. 1 7 The
amended Rule further provides that it does not intend to force the
closure of small or medium-sized transplant centers or diminish access
to organs for those in the rural areas served by such centers. 18 The
role of the Secretary of HHS was further clarified by the amend-
ments. 119 Despite the many attempts to block its implementation, the
Final Rule became effective March 22, 2000.121 Although the Rule is
now effective, its provisions may be short lived. Many members of
Congress are unhappy with the Rule as amended, and have taken
measures to nullify or modify the amended Rule. 12 1
113. See 64 Fed. Reg. 71,626 (Dec. 21, 1999) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 121).
114. See 64 Fed. Reg. 56,650 (Oct. 20, 1999) (codified as amended at 42 C.F.R. § 121).
115. See id. at 56,651.
116. See id.
117. See id. ("The final rule does not require single national lists for allocation of or-
gans, beyond the national registry lists already utilized by the OPTN .... [lI]t is the Depart-
ment's goal to achieve sharing of organs broad enough to achieve medically effective
results for patient.").
118. See id.
119. See id. at 56,652.
It is not the desire, nor is it the intention, of the department to interfere in the
practice of medicine. Decisions about who should receive a particular organ in a
particular situation involve levels of detail, subtlety and urgency that must be
judged by transplant professionals .... This rule also has been revised to empha-
size that the Secretary's review is intended to ensure consistency between OPTN
policies and the [NOTA].
Id.
120. See 65 Fed. Reg. 15,252 (Mar. 22, 2000) (codified as amended at 42 C.F.R. § 121).
121. See generally Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network Amendments of
2000, H.R. 2418, 106th Cong. (2000) and Organ Procurement and Transplantation Net-
work Amendments Act of 2000, S. 2366, 106th Cong. (2000).
[Vol. 35
With a new President taking office in January 2001, and with a
new Secretary of HHS, speculation surrounding the fate of the Final
Rule was rampant.122 However, the new Secretary-former Wisconsin
Governor Tommy Thompson, one of the most ardent critics of the
Rule-has indicated that he has no intent at the present time to
change it, and would await advice from UNOS and a committee estab-
lished by former Secretary Shalala before making any policy
changes 251
B. Pending Legislation to Modify the Final Rule
Immediately following the announcement of the Final Rule, sev-
eral bills proposed by members of Congress who opposed the HHS
Rule were introduced in the United States House of Representatives
and the United States Senate.' 24 One such bill, introduced in the Sen-
ate, had the support of the Clinton administration and appeared to
provide a compromise between parties favoring a local system of distri-
bution and those favoring a national system. 125 In contrast, a bill that
passed the House had the effect of nullifying the Final Rule issued by
the HHS. 126
1. The Senate Bill
On April 5, 2000, Senator Bill Frist, a former transplant surgeon
from Tennessee, introduced the Organ Procurement and Transplan-
tation Network Amendments Act of 2000 in the Senate ("Senate
bill"). 127 The Senate bill was hailed as a compromise between the Sen-
ate and the HHS.' 28 The bill did not attempt to set forth any trans-
plant policies, but authorized such policy decisions to be made by the
OPTN board.' 29
122. See, e.g., Associated Press, Thompson May Spark Fight on Organ Donations, RICHMOND
TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 3, 2001, at A8.
123. See Marilynn Marchione, Transplant Setup Won't Change Now for the Time Being,
Thompson Won't Change Shalala Priority on Organ Recipients, Wis. ST. J., Feb. 12, 2001, at A3.
124. See Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network Amendments Act of 2000,
S.2366, 106th Cong. (2000).
125. See id.
126. See Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network Amendments of 2000, H.R.
2418, 106th Cong. § 9 (2000).
127. See generally Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network Amendments of
2000, S. 2366, 106th Cong. (2000).
128. See A Transplant Compromise, WASH. PosT, Apr. 19, 2000, at A26. See also Marlene
Cimons, White House, Senators OK Plan for Organ Transplants, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2000, at
A12.
129. See Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network Amendments Act of 2000,
S. 2366, 106th Cong. § 372(a) (2) (B) (2000).
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The Senate bill required the OPTN to consult with Network par-
ticipants and UNOS and to establish the policies and functions of the
OPTN.130 Once the policies and functions of the OPTN are proposed,
the Senate bill required their submission to the Secretary. 13' The Sec-
retary, after receiving the proposals, would determine if they are con-
sistent with the proposed Senate act. 132 If the Secretary found the
proposals inconsistent, OPTN would be given the opportunity to re-
vise its proposals. 133 The Secretary would then determine whether the
revised policies are consistent with the Act; if they are not, the revi-
sions would be submitted to the Scientific Advisory Committee on Or-
gan Transplantation ("Advisory Committee"). 134
The Advisory Committee would consist of twenty-one members:
twelve transplant physicians or surgeons, and nine members distin-
guished in the health care field or who are transplant candidates, or-
gan donors, or family members of such individuals. The members
would be selected by the Secretary based in part on recommendations
from the IOM and the OPTN. 35 Thirty days after the submission of
the revisions to the Advisory Committee, the revisions would be ap-
proved or disapproved by a majority vote of the Advisory Commit-
tee. 136 If disapproved, the revisions would not take effect until
approved by the Committee. 137
While the notion of an independent Advisory Committee consist-
ing of members knowledgeable of the transplant process is appealing,
an Advisory Committee may do more harm than good. The Senate bill
required that any policy proposed by OPTN be approved by the Advi-
sory Committee before it could be enforced. 138 However, approval by
the Advisory Committee may not be easily received on an issue that is
the source of intense debate. The Senate bill has been criticized on
this point because of the potential for delaying any actual changes in
the transplant system. 3 9
130. See id. at § 372(c)(1)(A).
131. See id. at § 372(e) (1) (B) (i).
132. See id. at § 372(e)(1)(D)(i).
133. See id. at § 372(e)(1)(D) (ii).
134. See id. at § 372(e)(1)(E) (ii) (II).
135. See id. at § 372(e) (2) (C) (i)-(iiii) ("The committee shall be composed of 21 mem-
bers, of which (i) seven members shall be appointed ... from nominations submitted by
the [OPTN] ... (ii) seven members... appointed.., from nominations submitted by the
[IOM] . . . and (iii) seven members shall be appointed by the Secretary.").
136. See id. at § 372(e)(1)(E) (iii).
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See A Transplant Compromise, WASH. POST (Editorial), Apr. 19, 2000, at A26.
[Vol. 35
The Senate bill passed the Senate Health, Education, Labor and
Pensions Committee unanimously.1 40 However, compromise negotia-
tions fell apart before the bill reached the Senate Floor.1 4' The bill
has not been reintroduced by Senator Frist in the 107th Congress, and
as of the date of publication, Senator Frist had no plans to reintro-
duce the bill. Rather, he has opted to take a "wait and see" approach
as to whether Secretary Thompson will overturn the Final Rule.
2. The House of Representatives Bill
The House version of the Organ Procurement and Transplanta-
tion Network Amendments Act of 2000 restated many of the powers of
the OPTN that were given to it by NOTA.142 The bill, introduced by
Representative Michael Bilirakis, specifically provided that OPTN
would carry out studies and demonstration projects to improve proce-
dures for organ procurement and develop a peer review system to as-
sure that OPOs comply with specified criteria.1 43 The House bill
reassigned the responsibility of promulgating an annual report on the
status of organ transplantation from the Secretary to the OPTN. 144
This reassignment of responsibility demonstrates the House bill's in-
tent to assign a more passive role to the Secretary-that of oversight of
the transplantation process.
1 45
The most notable and controversial provision in the House bill
was Section Nine, entitled "Nullification of Final Rule Relating to Or-
gan Procurement and Transplantation Network."1 46 Section Nine pro-
posed abolishing the force and legal effect of the Final Rule. 147 The
HHS voiced its opposition to several of the provisions contained in
the House bill, specifically the bill's inaction on decreasing the reli-
140. See Thomas, Bill Summary and Status, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bd
query/z?d106:HR02418:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Nov. 10, 2000).
141. See id.
142. See Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network Amendments Act of 2000,
H.R. 2418, 106th Cong. § 3 (2000).
143. See id. at § 3(e)(1).
144. See Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network Amendments Act of 2000,
H.R. 2418, 106th Cong. § 4(a)(4)(A) (2000).
145. See Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network Amendments Act of 2000,
H.R. 2418, 106th Cong. § 2(a) (3) (2000).
146. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network Amendments Act of 2000, H.R.
2418, 106th Cong. § 9 (2000).
147. See id. ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the final rule relating to the
Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, promulgated by the [HHS] and pub-
lished in the Federal Register on April 2, 1998 ... and amended on October 20, 1999 ...
shall have no force or legal effect.").
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ance on arbitrary geographic boundaries in distributing organs, 148
and Section Three's erosion of HHS authority in the organ procure-
ment process. 149
The House bill was approved by the members of the House of
Representatives on April 4, 2000 by a roll call vote of 275-147. 150 The
bill was sent to the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions
Committee. 51 No action was taken on the bill prior the close of the
106th Congress, and as a result, the bill died. There has been no ac-
tion taken to reintroduce this bill in the 107th Congress.
Representative Bilirakis, like Senator Frist, has elected not to re-
introduce this piece of legislation into the 107th Congress. Rather, he
has decided to focus on the ever-important issue of increasing organ
donation. On February 14, 2001, Representative Bilirakis introduced a
bill in the House that would amend the Public Health Service Act to
promote organ donation. 152 The bill proposes that the Secretary make
grants to OPOs for the purpose of "providing for the payment of
travel and subsistence expenses incurred by individuals toward mak-
ing living donations of their organs."1 53 Additionally, the bill proposes
several measures to increase public awareness in the importance of
organ donation. 54
IV. Analysis of National and Local Distribution Systems
As previously stated, Congress enacted NOTA to improve the or-
gan procurement and allocation systems.1 55 NOTA directed the HHS
to establish a nationwide Organ Procurement and Transplantation
Network that would keep a registry of donors and donees and dis-
tribute organs among regional organ procurement organizations.1 56
The HHS enacted the Final Rule in response to criticism that the ex-
isting system was medically ineffective and resulted in inequitable dis-
148. See OPTN Hearing, supra note 9, at 25 (statement of William F. Raub, Ph.D., Dep-
uty Assistant Secretary for Science Policy) ("[T]he bill does nothing to decrease the reli-
ance on arbitrary geographic boundaries and the equities that result.").
149. See id. at 26 ("H.R. 2418 would erode the role of the federal government in provid-
ing oversight of the OPTN .... The Department believes that it must continue to be an
active partner with the private-sector in striving to fulfill the goals of the OPTN.").
150. 146 CONG. REC. H1722 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 2000).
151. See Thomas, Bill Summary and Status, at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bon/bdquery/
z?d106:HR02418 (last visited Nov. 11, 2000).
152. See Organ Donation Improvement Act of 2001, H.R. 624, 107th Cong. (2001).
153. Id. at § 377(a)(1).
154. See id. at § 377(a)-(c).
155. See H.R. REP. No. 575 (1983).
156. See 42 U.S.C. § 274(b) (2) (1994).
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tribution. 157 Despite the HHS's denials that the Rule advocates for a
national system of organ donation, it is apparent that the Rule vests in
the Secretary alone the power to make determinations concerning the
type of distribution system to be used. This raises the question as to
what type of distribution system can best serve the intent of NOTA.
This Section analyzes both the national and local distribution systems
in an effort to provide some guidance in answering this question.
A. Flaws in the Local Distribution System
Prior to the enactment of the HHS original Final Rule, organs
were distributed through local OPOs.158 The local OPO would check
the list of patients awaiting transplants in the local area first.15 9 If no
match was found in the local area, the organ would be checked re-
gionally, and if a match was still not found, it would be made available
to patients nationally. 160 This distribution scheme has been the sub-
ject of much criticism because of the discrepancy in the supply of or-
gans available to the various OPOs. 16' The "local first" system has also
been criticized as unfair to low income and minority transplant
patients.162
The local system of organ allocation was originally adopted be-
cause it was not scientifically feasible for organs to travel across the
country for transplantation. 163 Organs have cold ischemic times,' 64 va-
rying depending upon the organ, which limit the time the organ can
survive outside of the body.' 65 Technological breakthroughs in recent
years have increased the cold ischemic times for many organs, making
it possible for them to live outside of the body longer, and increasing
the feasibility of a national system of distribution.1 66 As a result, the
157. See 64 Fed. Reg. 56,650 (Oct. 20, 1999) (codified in 42 C.F.R. § 121).
158. See United Network for Organ Sharing, Newsroom, available at http://www.unos.
org/Newsroom/allaboutmain.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2000).
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See OPTN Hearing, supra note 9, at 34 (statement of Robert D. Gibbons, Member,
Institute of Medicine).
162. See id. at 35.
163. See Putting Patients First Hearings, supra note 1, at 69 (statement of the Honorable
Donna E. Shalala, Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services).
164. "Cold ischemic time" is the time when blood flow to the organ is stopped in the
donor to the time that blood flow is restored in the recipient. See IOM Report, supra note
66, at 17.
165. See United Network for Organ Sharing, Glossary, at http://www.unos.org/news
room/glos_main.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2000).
166. See IOM Report, supra note 66, at 17.
Summer 2001] ORGAN ALLOCATION
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
notion of local allocation as the only means of organ procurement
can be challenged.
1. Regional Discrepancies in Waiting Periods
An ardent criticism of the local first system is the fact that where a
patient lives often determines how quickly she receives an organ. 167
The OPOs cover populations ranging from approximately one million
to twelve million.1 68 Within these populations, there are a dispropor-
tionate number of organs available for transplant. One critic noted
that "liver patients needing transplants might wait 46 days in Iowa, but
721 days in western Pennsylvania. Similar disparities were found be-
tween New York, where a typical... wait [is] 511 days for a transplant,
and .. .New Jersey, where waiting times average 56 days."1 69 Some
states, like Wisconsin, have taken activist roles in the procurement of
organs and do not wish to have their organs go to patients outside the
state.' 70 This is obviously beneficial to patients that by fortuity reside
in those activist states-like Wisconsin-but it is quite unfortunate for
transplant patients that live in less activist states or states that happen
to have a low organ donation rate despite state encouragement of
donation.
2. Most Needy Patients Do Not Get Organs
When organs are distributed locally first, they often go to patients
in the state who are ranked as Status 2 or Status 3 patients. Status 2
and 3 patients are not nearly as ill as Status 1 patients and they do not
need an immediate transplantation.17' With a local distribution sys-
tem, Status 2 and 3 patients in the local area get priority in receiving
167. See OPt'NHearing, supra note 9, at 21 (statement of William F. Raub, Ph.D., Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Science Policy).
168. See id. at 32 (statement of Robert D. Gibbons, Member, Institute of Medicine).
169. Sarah Yang, U.S. Seeks to Overhaul Organ Transplant Policy, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1999,
at Al.
170. See Surprise! HHS OPTN Final Rule Takes Effect March 16 What it Means and For How
Long Remains Questionable, 10 TRANSPLANT NEWS 6, Mar. 27, 2000 (quoting Wisconsin Attor-
ney General James Doyle as stating: "Wisconsin patients are hurt by this new rule ....
Because our state's organ donation rates are high and our transplant centers are outstand-
ing, Wisconsin patients usually get vital organs faster than other states. This new rule pun-
ishes us because we have been effective."). See a/soJohn Tuohy, Sickest to get Transplants First,
Some Question Wisdom of Making Urgency, Not Location, Priority, USA TODAY, Aug. 28, 2000, at
D6 (quoting TonyJewell, spokesman for Wisconsin Governor, stating "Wisconsin's donor
rate is double the national rate, so we feel like we are getting penalized for doing a good
job if our organs go elsewhere").
171. See OJIJN Hearing, supra note 9, at 32 (statement of Robert D. Gibbons, Member,
Institute of Medicine).
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an organ over Status 1 patients in another state. 172 This system of dis-
tribution results in local, less needy patients getting an organ trans-
plant at the expense of out-of-state patients who are in dire need of a
transplant, simply because they are served by different OPOs.1
73
In its report, the IOM concluded that "because the probability of
a suitable match between a donated liver and a [S] tatus 1 patient in-
creases as the size of the population covered increases,.., liver alloca-
tion should be established to cover an area large enough to serve at
least 9 million people." 174 Livers have one of the longest cold ischemic
time of any organ, and are thus capable of transportation over a
broader region. 175
Critics of the local system of distribution doubt its effectiveness in
providing organs to the most needy patients. The discrepancies in
waiting periods between the various OPOs demonstrate the unfairness
that arises in a local system of organ distribution. The problems that
plague the local system of distribution are arguably lessened or elimi-
nated by a national system of distribution; however, as discussed be-
low, the national system is not without its share of difficulties and has
been criticized as wasting organs, causing the closure of small and me-
dium-sized OPOs, and discouraging organ donation.
B. Flaws in a National Distribution System
The HHSjustified its amended Rule as a means to overcome the
"vast geographic disparities in waiting times for potential organ trans-
plant recipients."17 6 The HHS also cited recent medical advances
which overcome the need for local distribution of organs. 177 When
the OPTN first established its local distribution system, the ischemic
time for most organs was just a few hours. Medical advances have
made it possible for livers to "be kept viable for transplantation up to
eighteen hours [and] ... [k]idneys can last from twelve to eighteen
hours outside the human body. 178 These tremendous scientific ad-
vances make a broader system of organ distribution more feasible.
However, like the local system of distribution, a broader or national
system of organ allocation is far from perfect.
172. See id. at 33.
173. See id.
174. Id.
175. See United Network for Organ Sharing, Glossary, at http://www.unos.org/News
room/glosmain.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2000).
176. Chen, supra note 81, at 272.
177. See id.
178. Id.
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1. Wasting Organs
During the comment period between the original Final Rule and
its amendment, UNOS expressed concern that the Final Rule did not
give adequate consideration to a transplant patient's survival potential
in determining whether the patient is a suitable donee. 179 UNOS rec-
ommended that a transplant patient's survival potential be considered
in determining the patient's eligibility for an organ. 180 Organ "wast-
age" is "more likely to occur when a patient's survival potential is rela-
tively low compared to other eligible patients."'181 In other words, the
best use of an organ may be to transplant it into a patient that is not as
ill as other patients because that patient may take to the organ better
and have a longer life after the transplant. There are many patients
who need a transplant but are so ill that the likelihood of their surviv-
ing long with the transplanted organ is very low. The transplant story
of baseball great Mickey Mantle illustrates this point. Mantle "received
his liver transplant forty-eight hours after being listed on the trans-
plant list and died two months later." 8 2 Mantle's transplant high-
lighted several of the serious flaws in the organ allocation system,
including the potential for wastage, and the lack of clear guidelines
prohibiting organ allocation based on status or fame.
2. Closure of Small and Medium-Sized Transplant Centers
One of the fears of opponents of a national transplant system is
that local OPOs would be put out of business.' 83 The concern is that
"increasing the geographic areas over which organs are distributed
would unduly favor large transplant centers," 184 resulting in the clo-
sure of small and medium-sized centers. 8 5 Small and medium-sized
centers often have a constituency composed of minority and low-in-
come transplant patients; closure of these centers would be devastat-
ing to such patients.1 86 The closing of these centers would also remove
179. See United Network for Organ Sharing, United Network for Organ Sharing United
Network for Organ Sharing and the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network Proposed Re-
vised Regulations: The OPTN's Recommended Changes to the April 2, 1998, OPTN Final Rule, at
www.unos.org/pdf/19990907_OPTNrevised.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2001).
180. See id.
181. Id.
182. Daubert, supra note 32, at 478.
183. See Putting Patients First Hearing, supra note 1, at 136 (statement of Dr. L. Hun-
sicker, President, UNOS).
184. IOM Report, supra note 66, at 43.
185. See id.
186. See Putting Patients First Hearing, supra note 1, at 136 (statement of Dr. L. Hun-
sicker. President. UNOS).
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the visual reminder of the need for organs that often serves as the
impetus for organ donation, "further exacerbat[ing] the existing or-
gan shortage."' 87
However, under a national system of distribution, small and me-
dium-sized centers will be benefited in ways not possible under a local
distribution system. A national system will allow smaller centers with
fewer donors to benefit by receiving organs from other centers to
transplant into their critical patients "that would have been otherwise
used by less urgent patients in the locale where the organ was
donated."' 8 8 Additionally, "if organs are allocated beyond the region
where they are procured, a local region need not produce as many
donors to ensure its patients are served."1 89
In addition to the benefits noted above, the IOM Report stated it
found no evidence that there would be a limitation on minority or
low-income patient access to organs.190 The Report stated, "[f] or low-
income patients, regardless of their racial or ethnic backgrounds,
there is an appropriate concern that they may not be referred to a
transplant center for an evaluation for transplantation."' 91 It also con-
cluded, based on available information, that smaller transplant cen-
ters are "not a major source of access for racial and ethnic
minorities." 92
3. Discouraging Organ Donations
Many state officials are concerned that an organ distribution sys-
tem which allocates organs on a national, or even a non-national but
broader allocation basis, would discourage organ donations.' 93 They
argue that organs are donated to assist those patients in a donor's
187. Daniel Luke Geyser, Organ Transplantation: New Regulations to Alter Distribution of
Organs, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 95, 96 (2000).
188. Id. at 97.
189. Id.
190. See OPTN Hearing, supra note 9, at 33 (statement of Robert D. Gibbons, Member,
Institute of Medicine). See also IOM Report, supra note 66, at 46.
191. Id. at 35.
192. Id. at 36.
193. See Sheryl Gay Solberg, States Want to Keep Organs, Louisiana's Law Considered a
Model, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. 11, 1999, at All (quoting Wisconsin Governor Tommy
Thompson as saying, "in this state, we go out and aggressively encourage people to become
donors, with me doing public service announcements. If I'm going to do that, I want those
organs to stay in the state and take care of the patients that need it [sic] in Wisconsin.").
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community, and donors will be less inclined to donate if they do not
have any connection to the patient receiving the organ. 194
However, a 1998 Gallup Poll on Organ Donation demonstrates
that a broader system of organ sharing would not discourage dona-
tion. 1 5 The poll asked "if you were going to be an organ donor, if you
learned that your organs would go to sick persons within your local
region before they Were offered to sicker persons elsewhere in the
U.S. would you be more likely to want to donate?" 196 The report stated
that "most adults say it would not affect their decision. However, 32%
say if they knew the organ recipient was the sickest person, regardless
of location, they would be more likely to donate an organ."1 9 7 The
poll demonstrates that donors are not as concerned with organs going
to patients in their local region as they are with the organ going to the
sickest patient.
Several measures have been taken in recent years by both the
HHS and UNOS to encourage organ donation. 9 In December, 1997,
Vice President Al Gore and HHS Secretary Shalala launched the Na-
tional Organ and Tissue Donation Initiative ("NOTDI").' 99 NOTDI
focuses on building partnerships and increasing family discussions
about decisions to donate, expanding opportunities for families to do-
nate, and learning more about what works to promote donation and
transplantation. 200 The goal of NOTDI is to increase organ donation
by twenty percent within two years. 201 In 1998, the first full year of the
NOTDI, organ donation increased 5.6%.202
In 1992, UNOS established the Coalition on Donation, a non-
profit alliance of forty-eight national organizations and fifty local co-
alitions dedicated to educating the public about organ and tissue
194. See John Tuohy, Sickest to get Transplants First Some Question Wisdom of Making Ur-
gency, Not Location, Priority, USA TODAY, Aug. 28, 2000, at D6.
195. See IOM Report, supra note 66, at 52.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See Press Release, HRSA, HHS Fact Sheet, National Organ and Tissue Donation Initia-
tive, at http://www.HHS.gov/news/press/1999pres/990519.html (May 19, 1999). See also
Coalition on Donation-Are you an organ and tissue donor?, at http://www.shareyourlife.org
(last visited Nov. 18, 2000).
199. See Press Release, HRSA, HHS Fact Sheet, National Organ and Tissue Donation Initia-
tive, at http://www.HHS.gov/news/press/1999pres/990519.html (May 19, 1999).
200. See id.
201. See 01I'N Hearing, supra note 9, at 70 (statement of the Honorable Donna E.
Shalala, Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services).
202. See Press Release, HRSA, HHS Fact Sheet, National Organ and Tissue Donation Initia-
tive, at http://www.HHS.gov/news/press/1999pres/990519.html (May 19, 1999).
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donation, and encouraging organ donation.20 3 These programs
aimed at encouraging organ donation should help to alleviate the
fears of those concerned that a broader allocation policy would dis-
courage donation. As mentioned in Part III, the focus in Congress has
shifted away from rejecting the Final Rule and toward a more con-
certed effort to increase organ donation. Such legislation, if enacted,
along with the NOTDI initiative, are positive steps to ensure that or-
gan donations will increase in the coming years.
V. Proposal
Although a national system of organ allocation seems most able
to carry out the purpose of NOTA, the HHS Final Rule allocates too
much power to the Secretary to determine the distribution system to
be used. A quasi-national system of organ distribution similar to that
recommended by the IOM Report is the best solution. 20 4 The role of
the Secretary should be circumscribed rather than expanded, and de-
cisions concerning allocation policies should be left to the transplant
healthcare specialists that are members of UNOS and the OPTN. Fi-
nally, serious efforts must be made to increase the number of organs
available for transplantation-without transplantable organs, the type
of distribution system used is irrelevant.
A. Quasi-National System of Organ Distribution
Advances in medical technology have greatly increased the cold
ischemic time for many organs, making it possible for them to survive
outside the body for longer periods of time.20 5 As previously stated,
the relatively short ischemic time of organs was one of the reasons that
a local system was proposed. However, scientific advances have made a
broader system of organ distribution increasingly possible.
Due to a variance in cold ischemic time depending upon the or-
gan, any organ allocation system must be organ specific. The IOM
Report's first recommendation was the establishment of broader
OAAs for livers.20 6 The recommended population base for each OAA
203. See Putting Patients First Hearing, supra note 1, at 148 (statement of Dr. L. Hun-
sicker, President, UNOS).
204. See IOM report, supra note 66, at 6-7.
205. See United Network for Organ Sharing, Glossary, at http://www.unos.org/News
room/glos_main.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2000) (observing that the preservation times for
organs are as follows: Heart, 4-6 hours; liver, 12-24 hours; kidney, 48-72 hours; heart-
lung, 4-6 hours; lung, 4-6 hours; pancreas, 12-24 hours).
206. See IOM Report, supra note 66, at 6.
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is at least nine million people.20 7 OPOs of this size have the ability to
provide transplants to sicker patients without adversely affecting less
sick patients. 91° The population base could be adjusted if the area
served would be too large to accommodate the cold ischemic time of
the organ. Though the IOM limited its recommendation to livers, if
medically feasible, organs with a cold ischemic time of twelve hours or
greater should be distributed to OAAs consisting of a population base
of nine million people.
To alleviate concerns that broader distribution of organs would
force small and medium-sized OPOs to shut down, the OAAs should
be established by sharing agreements20 9 among the OPOs, as recom-
mended by the IOM Report,210 rather than by consolidating existing
OPOs. Such sharing agreements are currently in use and have been
found to be effective.21' In addition to sharing agreements, UNOS
should take steps to create a policy to help small and medium-sized
OPOs remain viable and able to serve the needs of the patients in
their communities. Such a policy might provide that OPOs with too
many organs on hand at a given time are required to give those or-
gans to smaller OPOs having a difficult time satisfying the needs of
their respective community. By implementing such a policy, UNOS
would encourage and promote the use of sharing agreements. Addi-
tionally, a fund should be established to provide financial support to
any small and medium-sized OPOs affected adversely by broader
sharing.
These proposals will alleviate many of the criticisms associated
with a national system of distribution. A quasi-national system provides
a compromise between advocates of a local system of organ distribu-
tion and the supporters of a national system. A quasi-national system is
the most medically feasible system because many organs do not have
cold ischemic times that will allow them to be transported nationally.
Finally, the establishment of broader OAAs through sharing agree-
ments allows the states to maintain a large amount of control over
organs donated by their citizens.
207. See id.
208. See id. at 7.
209. A "sharing agreement" consists of two or more states agreeing to share organs
donated with the other members. See generally IOM Report, supra note 66.
210. See id.
211. See id.
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B. Discontinue Use of Waiting Time As an Allocation Criterion
As recommended by the IOM Report, waiting time should not be
a criterion for organ allocation because waiting time does not corre-
late with need, resulting in less ill patients receiving scarce organs.212
The IOM report stated:
The heterogeneity and wide range of severity of illness in statuses
2B and 3 make waiting time relatively misleading within these cate-
gories. For this reason, waiting time should be discontinued as an
allocation criterion for [S] tatus 2B and 3 patients. An appropriate
medical triage system should be developed to ensure equitable al-
location of organs to patients in these categories. Such a system,
may, for example, be based on a point system arising out of medi-
cal characteristics and disease prognoses rather than waiting
times.2 13
UNOS should undertake a study to identify criteria causing a pa-
tient to be in "more urgent" need of a transplant. The findings should
then be used to promulgate a uniform point system which transplant
physicians would be required to follow when adding a patient to a
transplant waiting list. It is imperative that the point system be de-
tailed to assure transplant physicians will be able to accurately diag-
nose their patient's needs. The system must also have an enforcement
mechanism to safeguard against abuse of discretion by transplant phy-
sicians. A check must be placed on each physician's determination,
and sanctions must be available for those physicians who overstate
their patient's need. The purpose of NOTA was to establish "an equi-
table policy and system.., so that individuals throughout [the] coun-
try have access to organ transplantation when appropriate and
necessary."214 This goal can only be effectuated if organs are distrib-
uted based on medical necessity.
C. limited Role of the HHS in the Organ Transplantation System
Though the IOM Report recommended greater federal over-
sight,215 such oversight must be circumscribed to prevent the Secre-
tary from unilaterally making decisions regarding the organ
distribution system. NOTA gave the Secretary the authority to "make
grants for the planning of qualified organ procurement organiza-
212. See id.
213. Id. at 90.
214. 130 CONG. Rrc. S8742 (1984) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
215. See IOM Report, supra note 66, at 131.
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tions."2 16 The Act also gave the Secretary the authority to "provide for
the establishment and operation of an Organ Procurement and
Transplantation Network." 2 17 The Act limited the Secretary's role to
informing the public of the need for organ donations, providing tech-
nical assistance to OPOs and the OPTN, and submitting an annual
report to Congress on the status of organ donation and an analysis of
the efficiency and effectiveness of the procurement and allocation of
organs. 2 18 The Secretary's role as set forth in NOTA is one of over-
sight, not active participation.
NOTA explicitly gave the authority of recommending policies for
the procurement of organs to the OPOs2 19 and the OPTN.220 The
amended Rule vests policy making decisions in the OPTN contractor
(UNOS) .221 However, it subjects any policy made by OPTN to Secreta-
rial review. 222 The amended Final Rule, as codified, states that OPTN,
when transmitting a proposed policy to the Secretary, should include
"supporting material . . . as the Secretary may require to assess the
likely effects of policy changes and as are necessary to demonstrate
that the proposed policies comply with the performance indica-
tors."223 This provision gives the Secretary the power to unilaterally
accept or reject any policy proposed by OPTN.
Federal oversight is vital to ensuring an effective and fair system
of organ distribution. However, the oversight of the organ donation
system should be carried out by an independent scientific board as
recommended by the IOM Report.224 The board's membership
should include transplant physicians, scientists, representatives from
the OPOs, transplant patients, and donors. The board should have
primary responsibility of overseeing the organ procurement and do-
nation process, and should have the authority to review the policies
proposed by the OPTN contractor. Such an independent board will
ensure fairness in the system and prevent the Secretary of HHS, a po-
216. National Organ and Transplantation Act, Pub. L. No. 98-507, § 372 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 273) (1984).
217. Id. at § 374.
218. See id. at § 375.
219. See id. at § 371 (stating that the board of directors of an OPO "has the authority to
recommend policies for the procurement of organs").
220. See id. at § 372 (stating that the OPTN shall "adopt and use standards of quality for
the acquisition and transportation of donated organs").
221. See Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 42 C.F.R. § 121.4(a)
(2000).
222. See id. at § 121.4(b).
223. Id.
224. See IOM Report, supra note 66, at 14-15.
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litical appointee, from furthering a political agenda by unilaterally
electing a system of organ donation.
D. Promote Organ Donation
The most important recommendation of this Comment is to pro-
mote organ donation. If the supply of organs were adequate to meet
the needs of all patients awaiting a transplant, the debate over a na-
tional or local system of distribution would be moot. Unfortunately,
the available supply of suitable organs is far from adequate. It is im-
perative that the organizations involved in the organ donation and
transplantation process work together to inform the public of the
need for organ donation and to encourage the public to donate their
organs.
Steps must be taken on both state and national levels to provide
awareness of the need for organs. Measures, such as the one proposed
by Representative Bilirakis and discussed previously, are a step in the
right direction. Funds must be established to ensure donors do not
bear any of the costs associated with donating their organs. Penn-
sylvania has proposed a controversial method to encourage organ do-
nation.225 The proposal would "help defray the organ donor's family
funeral expenses by providing $300 from a special state fund directly
to the funeral home that handles the donor's burial arrangements." 226
The controversy surrounding the proposal lies in the concern that the
state is essentially paying for organs, which is prohibited by NOTA.227
However, advocates of the proposal argue since the funeral home is
paid directly, there is no direct compensation to the deceased's
family.228
Additionally, recognition of organ donors might provide an in-
centive to donate. The option to donate an organ should be available
when applying for-a driver's license. Secretary Thompson has urged
Americans to "talk with their families about organ donation and desig-
nate their wish to give life on their driver's license or by signing a
donor card."229 Secretary Thompson has also called on doctors to "tell
Americans about the need for transplants. '"2 30 It is imperative the
word be spread to all Americans about the necessity of organ dona-
225. See id. at 58.
226. Id.
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. United Network for Organ Sharing, Newsroom, available at http://www.unos.org/
Newsroom/archive-story_20010314_tommythompson.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2001).
230. Id.
Summer 2001 ]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
tion. Additionally, the process of registering as an organ donor must
be simplified to ensure no barriers exist to the increase of organ
donations.
Conclusion
The ability of physicians to take an organ from one human being
and place it in another human being to save a life is truly miraculous.
As medical technology advances, allowing patients waiting for an or-
gan transplant to live longer, the need for organs will greatly increase.
In an ideal world, there would be enough organs to satisfy the need.
However, the world we live in is far from ideal and we must take action
to ensure that those who need an organ transplant get one. There is
unanimous agreement that measures to encourage and increase or-
gan donation must be taken to save the nearly 4,000 patients that die
annually while waiting for a transplant.
Parties have diverged, however, upon the issue of allocating the
organs which are donated. The HHS Final Rule initially recom-
mended a national organ allocation system, but later adopted the rec-
ommendation of the IOM Report suggesting OAAs of nine million
people. Several states have taken extreme measures to see that organs
donated in the state do not leave the state unless a suitable donor
cannot be found there. Congress too has attempted to limit the effect
of the Final Rule, but was unsuccessful in getting such legislation
passed before the conclusion of the 106th Congress.
A cautious approach to organ allocation is necessary, as both the
Final Rule and its opponents attempt to adjust and formulate a deli-
cate system of organ allocation while the lives of thousands of Ameri-
cans hang in the balance. The Final Rule promulgated by the HHS
properly recognized that the existing system was flawed. The dispari-
ties in waiting times based on geography that resulted in the pre-Rule
system clearly did not carry out the intent of NOTA in establishing an
equitable organ allocation system. However, the Final Rule attempted
to correct the problem in the wrong way. Rather than vest power to
make decisions about organ distribution in a neutral, knowledgeable
body of members of the transplant community, the Final Rule vests
much of the decision-making power in a single political appointee,
the Secretary of HHS. To ensure that policies regarding organ distri-
bution are equitable and efficient, the role of the Secretary should be
circumscribed rather than expanded, and the ultimate decision-mak-
ing authority should lie with those most connected to the issue-
transplant patients and physicians.
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